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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GAIL PARSONS HEYES, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. Case No. 20588 
JOHN R. WARD, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Is the defendant, who has been solely employed by the 
University of Utah School of Medicine and Hospital for the past 
27 years, entitled to the protection of the provisions of the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 
et seg. (1977), for alleged acts or omissions occurring in the 
performance of his employment duties? 
2. May plaintiff assert for the first time on appeal an 
estoppel defense which was not raised in the lower court? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action for alleged medical malpractice brought 
by plaintiff against defendant, Dr. John R. Ward ("Dr. Ward") 
for treatment rendered to plaintiff by defendant at the 
University of Utah School of Medicine and Hospital, where 
Dr. Ward has been employed as an academic professor and Chief 
of the Division of Rheumatology since July 1957. 
Dr. Ward moved to dismiss plaintiff's Complaint in the 
lower court on the basis that, as an employee of the University 
of Utah, he may not be held individually liable apart from the 
University for acts and omissions occurring in the performance 
of his duties or within the scope of his employment, unless he 
acted with fraud or malice. The lower court continued defen-
dant's motion to allow plaintiff time to conduct discovery into 
Dr. Ward's employment relationship with the University of 
Utah. Defendant's motion was subsequently renewed as a motion 
for summary judgment. The lower court, the Honorable Leonard 
H. Russon presiding, granted defendant's motion and entered 
summary judgment. This appeal followed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Dr. John R. Ward is a board certified specialist in the 
field of internal medicine. [R. 69-3.] He has been perma-
nently employed at the University of Utah School of Medicine 
and Hospital since July 1, 1957. [R. 10, 15, 69-4.] He serves 
on the medical school's academic faculty and is Chief of the 
Division of Rheumatology in the Department of Internal 
Medicine. [R. 8, 10, 69-4.] 
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Dr. Ward's employment duties for the University include the 
teaching and training of medical students, medical research, 
and the treatment and care of patients who visit the Univer-
sity's state-owned hospital. [R. 10, 11, 69-5.] His sole 
source of professional income is the regular University payroll 
check he receives every two weeks. [R. 69-6.] Dr. Ward does 
not maintain a private practice or see any patients outside the 
University Hospital. [R. 69-8.] Charges for Dr. Ward's 
services are billed and collected by the University physician's 
billing office. 
Dr. Ward treated plaintiff Gail Parsons Heyes for her 
rheumatoid arthritis condition exclusively at the University 
Hospital, within the scope of his employment duties with the 
University. [R. 8, 9, and 11.] Plaintiff does not claim 
Dr. Ward ever misrepresented to her his employment relationship 
with the University. She claims only that Dr. Ward never 
specifically told her he was employed by the University. [R. 
34-35.] She nevertheless made her first checks payable to 
Dr. Ward in care of the Division of Arthritis [R. 36], and 
later made payment in care of the Division of Rheumatology at 
the University Hospital address [R. 35, 42, and Brief of 
Appellant, p. 4]. 
Plaintiff filed her Complaint in this action on May 9, 
1984. [R. 2-3.] Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss in 
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response to the Complaint. [R. 6-7.] The motion was supported 
by the Affidavits of Dr. Ward [R. 8-9], and Dr. G. Richard Lee 
[R. 10-11]. Plaintiff did not raise any objection to the affi-
davits. The lower court denied plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss, 
without prejudice, and allowed plaintiff 60 days to pursue 
discovery as to the defendant's employment relationship with 
the University. [R. 24.] Plaintiff took Dr. Ward's deposition 
and served Interrogatories. She also filed her own affidavit 
in opposition to defendant's motion. [R. 34-49.] At the com-
pletion of the discovery permitted by the lower court, defen-
dant's motion was renewed. The lower court entered Summary 
Judgment in defendant's favor. [R. 64-66.] This appeal 
followed. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Utah legislature has established as the public policy 
of this State that the employees of governmental entities are 
to be protected against personal liability for acts performed 
in furtherance of their official duties and employment. 
Dr. John R. Ward has been employed by the University of Utah 
School of Medicine and Hospital exclusively for the past 28 
years. His employment duties at the University include the 
treatment of patients, such as plaintiff, who come to the 
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University's state-owned hospital for medical care. As a 
matter of law, Dr. Ward's treatment of plaintiffs rheumatoid 
arthritis condition, performed solely at the University 
Hospital, was within the performance and scope of his employ-
ment with the University. He is therefore entitled to the 
protection of the provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act and the judgment of the lower court should be affirmed. 
Plaintiff's argument that Dr. Ward is estopped to assert 
governmental immunity as a defense was not raised before the 
lower court and may not, therefore, be asserted for the first 
time in this appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DR. WARD'S TREATMENT OF PLAINTIFF WAS 
RENDERED IN THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTIES AS 
AN EMPLOYEE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH AND 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM IS THEREFORE BARRED BY THE 
PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY 
ACT. 
The provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30-1 et seg. (1977) (hereinafter "the Act"), 
provide the exclusive remedy against a governmental entity or 
its employee for any injury caused by an act or omission "which 
occurs during the performance of such employee's duties, within 
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the scope of employment, or under color of authority . . . ." 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3(3) (Supp. 1983). The term "govern-
mental entity/' as defined by the Act, includes the state of 
Utah and any hospital, college or university of the state. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(1) (Supp. 1983). 
A state employee whose act or omission is alleged to have 
caused injury to a plaintiff may be joined in a lawsuit against 
the governmental entity, but only in a representative capacity 
and only if the act or omission is one for which the entity 
itself is liable. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-4(4) (Supp, 1983). 
The employee may never be held personally liable, unless he 
acted through gross negligence, fraud or malice, Xd.J see 
Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627, 633 (Utah 1983) ("Section 
63-30-4 precludes all statutory or common law causes of action 
against an employee in his or her personal capacity for acts or 
omissions which occur during the performance of the employee's 
duties. . . . " ) . 
It is undisputed that Dr. John Ward was an employee of the 
University of Utah at all times when he rendered health care 
treatment to plaintiff. Plaintiff seeks to impose personal 
liability upon Dr. Ward, but has not alleged he acted through 
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gross negligence, fraud or malice.1 Dr. Ward is therefore 
entitled to the protection afforded by the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act, and the judgment of the lower court in his favor 
is correct, if the acts or omissions alleged by plaintiff 
occurred "during the performance of [Dr. Ward's] duties, within 
the scope of employment or under color of authority . . . ." 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-4(4) (Supp. 1983). 
Plaintiff argues in her brief that the lower court erred in 
granting Dr. Ward summary judgment since there is a fact ques-
tion as to whether the treatment he rendered plaintiff was 
within the scope of his employment at the University. It is 
not necessary for the court to even address plaintiff's scope 
of employment argument to decide this appeal. Section 
63-30-4(4) protects Dr. Ward against personal liability if his 
treatment of plaintiff was either within the performance of his 
employment duties or within the scope of his employment. These 
two statutory phrases, although obviously related, must be 
interpreted to represent different concepts. See Metropolitan 
Water Dist. of Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City, 14 Utah 2d 
171, 380 P.2d 721 (1963) (court must assume all words in 
*This is not a case where Dr. Ward is joined in a repre-
sentative capacity in an action against the University of 
Utah. Plaintiff lost any potential claim she may have had 
against the University since she did not file a timely notice 
of claim as required by Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12 (Supp. 1983). 
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statute were used advisedly and should be given meaning); 
Durfey v. Board of Education of Wayne County School Dist., 604 
P.2d 480, 484 (Utah 1979) (duty of Supreme Court is to give 
effect to every word, clause and sentence of legislative 
enactment). 
It is undisputed on the record before this Court that 
Dr. Ward's employment duties with the University of Utah 
include the treatment of patients who come to the University of 
Utah Medical Center and Hospital. [R. 69-5.] Dr. Ward's depo-
sition and the Affidavits of Dr. Ward and Dr. G. Richard Lee, 
Dean of the School of Medicine, further establish that 
Dr. Ward's treatment of plaintiff was rendered in the perfor-
mance of his duties with the University.2 Plaintiff's own 
affidavit, stating that Dr. Ward never told her he was a 
University employee, does not raise an issue of fact concerning 
Dr. Ward's employment situation. A person's ignorance of an 
agency relationship does not change the fact that the relation-
ship exists, and is not a basis for imposing liability upon the 
agent. 
2Plaintiff's argument that the affidavits are conclusory 
and should not therefore have been considered by the lower 
court is not timely. Plaintiff waived any objection she may 
have had to the affidavits by failing to move to strike or 
otherwise object to the affidavits in the lower court. See 
Strange v. Ostlund, 594 P.2d 877, 880 (Utah 1979) (if opposing 
party does not move timely to object to or strike affidavits, 
party waives right to argue affidavits do not comply with Rule 
56(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure). 
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Dr. Ward's only professional employment since 1956 has been 
with the University of Utah School of Medicine and Hospital. 
His sole source of professional income is his bi-monthly salary 
check from the University. His compensation from the 
University does include a factored percentage of the income the 
University derives from the treatment of patients, as referred 
to by plaintiff. This fact does not in any way enhance plain-
tiff's claim. These receipts are entirely University funds, 
and the percentage Dr. Ward receives is negotiated each year as 
part of his salary package. [R. 69-9 and 10.] In fact, this 
arrangement further demonstrates that the University is the 
sole recipient of the income derived from Dr. Ward's services. 
Dr. Ward's treatment of plaintiff's rheumatoid arthritis 
was rendered only at the University Hospital. Plaintiff 
received billing statements from the physician's billing office 
at the University Hospital, and made her checks payable to 
Dr. Ward in care of the "Division of Rheumatology" and 
"Division of Arthritis." The only conclusion possible on the 
record before this Court was that Dr. Ward was indeed acting in 
the "performance of his duties" during his professional treat-
ment of plaintiff's arthritis condition. 
A similar conclusion must be reached on the facts before 
this Court even if the operative issue is whether the acts of 
Dr. Ward were "within the scope of his employment." Contrary 
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to plaintiff's argument, the issue of scope of employment may 
be decided as a matter of law where there is but one reasonable 
conclusion to be reached on the facts. See e.g. Baird v. 
Farmer Bros. Northwest, Inc., 14 Utah 2d 279, 382 P.2d 883 
(1963); Combined Ins. Co. of America v. Sinclair, 584 P.2d 1034 
(Wyo. 1978). As shown above, the facts before this Court can 
lead only to the conclusion that defendant acted within the 
scope of his employment in his treatment of plaintiff. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF MAY NOT ARGUE ESTOPPEL FOR THE 
FIRST TIME ON APPEAL. 
It is a well settled rule that an argument for estoppel 
must be presented to the trial court and cannot be asserted for 
the first time on appeal. See Davis v. Barrett, 24 Utah 2d 
162, 467 P.2d 603, 604 (1970) (claimant's subcontractor was 
estopped to deny release of lien was not presented to trial 
court and cannot be considered for first time on appeal; see 
also Villeneuve v. Schamanek, 639 P.2d 214 (Utah 1981) (summary 
judgment affirmed where contentions of appellant were not 
reflected in record but were argued for the first time in brief 
on appeal). An appellant who asserts an argument for estoppel 
has the affirmative burden to preserve and bring before this 
Court a record which affirmatively supports that his position 
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was argued to the lower court. Holman v. Sorenson, 556 P.2d 
499, 500 (Utah 1976). 
Plaintiff is unable to demonstrate on the record before 
this Court that she properly and timely raised before the lower 
court her argument that Dr. Ward is estopped to raise the 
defense of the provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 12-13.) Plaintiff is therefore 
precluded from now raising such an argument for the first time 
on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The Utah legislature has established by statute its intent 
that government employees be protected from personal liability, 
and the attendant time and expense of litigation, for acts 
performed in the furtherance of their employment duties. If a 
claimant is allowed to drag an employee through the time and 
expense of litigation by merely alleging that the employee was 
not acting in the performance of his official duties simply 
because he did not disclose to the claimant his agency rela-
tionship, then the salutary purpose and protection granted by 
the legislature is seriously undermined, if not eliminated. 
Dr. Ward is a long time employee of the University of 
Utah. Upon the undisputed record before this Court, his treat-
ment of plaintiff was rendered within the performance of his 
employment duties with the University and within the scope of 
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his employment. He is therefore entitled to the protection of 
the provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act# and the 
judgment of the lower court in his favor should be affirmed. 
DATED this 5th day of August, 1985. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Merlin R. Lybbert^ 
Bruce H. Jensen 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Respondent 
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